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Abstract  
In this study, we perform a comprehensive analysis of municipal auditing, exploring 
its several steps: procurement, decision on selection criteria, selection, render and payment of 
services, and opinion provided. Our setting is Portugal, where external auditing of 
municipalities’ accounts has recently been introduced. Our dataset is unique, resulting from 
merging new survey data with data that is not publicly available. We find that the majority of 
municipalities acquire auditing services through direct selection and choose their auditors 
based upon the lowest price selection criterion. However, municipalities which employ a 
more sophisticated procurement process, where political competition is lower and where 
citizens’ interest is higher, employ the lowest price selection criterion less frequently. The 
auditor selected is usually a firm (instead of an individual CPA), but never one of the Big 4 
companies. The audit fee paid for the auditing services is higher when the level of citizens’ 
interest increases, and lower when the municipality has an internal auditing office. Finally, 
when the auditor issues a qualified opinion, the auditor fee is also higher. 
 
Keywords: local government, political competition, lowest price selection criterion, audit 
fees, Portugal. 
JEL Classification: M41; M42  
  
 2 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 Municipalities play an important role in most European countries (Johnsen et al., 
2001) as they support development projects directly and cooperate with national governments 
and European institutions in their plans for growth. A study by the Council of European 
Municipalities and Regions (2010) indicates that public expenditure by the local sector 
represents, on average, 13.7% of the European Union (EU)’s Gross Domestic Product and 
27.0% of its total public expenditure, with a value of 1,676.8 billion euro in 2010. 
Furthermore, public procurement has become more relevant in recent years, as countries face 
unrelenting budget constraints, government downsizing, and public demand for increased 
transparency (Thai, 2017). 
When municipalities hire auditing firms, they use a procurement process, as required 
by EU regulation for all acquisitions made by the public sector. Municipalities choose this 
process as well as its selection criteria. Procurement can be done by direct selection or 
competitive bidding. Municipalities can select the external auditor which offers the lowest 
price, or consider technical factors, together with price, in their selection – this is called 
choosing the most economically advantageous proposal. 
 In this study, we perform a comprehensive analysis of municipal auditing in Portugal. 
The number, diverse nature and economic importance of municipalities in Portugal as well as 
the recent adoption of external auditing and the fact that no Big 4 firm audits the sample 
municipalities, creates an unique setting for our investigation. We first document whether 
municipalities use direct selection or competitive bidding as a procurement method. Next, we 
investigate whether the lowest price selection criterion is generally used by municipalities, 
and the factors that may determine this choice, as the extensive use of this selection criterion 
may lead auditing firms to use dumping prices or pressure on the audit time budget. Finally, 
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we study audit fees, examining how these change with citizens’ interest, the existence of an 
internal auditing office, and the auditors’ opinion. Thus, we explore the several steps of 
municipality auditing: procurement, decision on selection criteria, selection, render and 
payment of services, and opinion provided.    
  The main source of data is a survey conducted by the authors, which was addressed 
to the heads of financial divisions of all the Portuguese municipalities. From a potential 
sample of 308 municipalities, we received 57 valid responses, with information regarding 
local companies’ participation (the legal criterion for compulsory external auditing), public 
procurement practices (procurement process, selection criteria, factors considered in 
proposals which use the most advantageous proposal criteria, number of tenders), and 
auditing characteristics (audit fees, auditor type, and existence of an internal auditing office). 
Our analysis starts in 2007 because that is when external auditing became compulsory for 
some municipalities. The period of the study comprises five years, ending in 2011. 
An initial analysis of the data for the first step of the audit process (procurement) 
reveals that the majority of municipalities acquire auditing services through competitive 
bidding. As mentioned, municipalities also choose the selection criteria. We find that most 
Portuguese municipalities choose their auditors based upon the lowest price selection 
criterion. Given that sophisticated procurement mechanisms should help identify and hire 
preferred quality auditors, we first test whether the use of the lowest price selection criterion 
is associated with procurement sophistication, political competition and citizens’ interests. 
We find that a more sophisticated process is associated with a smaller frequency of selection 
via the lowest price criterion. This sophistication is measured by three complementarily 
significant variables: direct selection procurement, length of the auditor’s mandate, and 
number of proposals received. From our logit, we also find that in municipalities with a 
higher concentration of votes (i.e., where competition is lower), the use of the lowest price 
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criterion is less frequent. The third determinant is citizens’ interest, measured by government 
grants, and our results indicate that the value of government transfers is also negatively 
associated with the use of the lowest price criterion.    
Once the proposals come in, municipalities choose their auditor. We find no presence 
of the Big 4 auditing firms in our sample, which is unusual. The choice of auditor will 
determine the audit fees to be paid. Our second hypothesis predicts that the audit fees are 
positively associated with citizens’ interest and qualified opinions (as these are may lead to 
more work) and negatively associated with the existence of an internal auditing office at the 
municipality (assuming the work of this office is reliable). We find that audit fees are 
positively associated with citizens’ interest, which suggests that an expectation of more 
scrutiny (due to interest) leads to more audit hours and a higher audit fee. Moreover, the 
existence of an internal auditing office in the municipality is associated with lower audit fees, 
indicating that the internal auditors provide valuable assistance to the external auditors. 
Finally, we find that most of the opinions issued by auditors are qualified opinions, and that 
these paid are positively associated with audit fees. This suggests that when auditors find 
some issues of concern in the municipalities’ accounts, this leads to a more detailed audit, 
which is costlier. 
 This study brings together several strands of the audit literature: (i) audit procurement, 
(ii) audit fees, (iii) public accounts, and (iv) political competition, while analyzing a unique 
dataset. Our findings should be of interest to governments and regulators, given the focus on 
municipalities and the fact that external auditing comes as a consequence of EU regulations. 
The importance of auditing and its impact on the quality of accounts, combined with the 
evidence that the lowest price criterion dominates auditor’s selection, should lead officials to 
motivate municipalities to consider other factors (besides price). Finally, our results should be 
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of interest to auditors, as our evidence suggests benefits of working with municipalities’ 
internal auditing offices and having longer mandates. 
  
2. Institutional settings 
 The Portuguese Constitution recognizes three types of local governments in Portugal: 
municipalities, regions, and parishes. Portuguese municipalities promote economic and social 
development, and can also perform central government functions, if a contract is signed for 
that purpose. They are responsible for social housing, civil protection, and utilities’ 
infrastructures, among other functions. Additionally, under a contract, they can be 
responsible for meals provided in public schools, transportation of students, etc. 
Municipalities’ importance in citizens’ lives creates ample interest in their funding 
and performance. Notwithstanding the existence of direct revenues from taxes, goods, and 
services, municipalities also participate in the partition of public resources, i.e., central 
government taxes. A study by the Certified Public Accountants Board (the Annual Financial 
Directory of Portuguese Municipalities, 2013) notes that Portuguese municipalities receive 
most of their revenues from the central government, with a financial independence of only 
33.7% (considering the period from 2007 to 2013).1  
 The municipal financial system produces both accrual-based and budgetary results, 
but there is no compulsory reconciliation of the two sets of data. The application of accrual 
accounting started in 2001. Nevertheless, in the financial year of 2007, according to the 
annual financial directory of Portuguese municipalities, there were still several mistakes in 
the application of accrual accounting by many municipalities. Municipality accounts are 
homologated by the Court of Accounts.  
Since the enactment of Law 2/2007, municipalities which own shares in companies 
(local, municipal, intermunicipal, or commercial), or have a seat in a foundation, need to be 
 6 
 
audited by an external auditor. By the local finances law, a certified public auditor who is 
named as an external auditor in a municipality must be approved by the municipal assembly, 
after a compulsory public procurement process.2 The first step in the procurement process of 
auditing services is for municipalities to decide whether they will do it through an open 
procedure, where all interested firms may submit tenders, or through a restricted procedure, 
where only invited suppliers may present tenders. The municipality chooses between 
competitive bidding (open procedure) and direct selection (restricted procedure).3 The next 
step is for municipalities to determine how selection will be done, once the tenders come in. 
The decision on the selection criterion is done a priori, as it is published in the announcement 
of the procurement. The selection can be based solely on price, if the decision is to choose the 
proposal with the lowest price, or consider technical factors in the selection process, which is 
referred to as choosing the most economically advantageous tender. 
 As usual, once the audit is complete, the auditor will issue its opinion. This opinion 
must cover the budget execution, the balance sheet, the profit and loss statement, the notes to 
the accounts, and any other items required by law or the Municipal Assembly, as the audit is 
carefully examined by the town council and the assembly. Moreover, once finalized, the 
auditors’ report will be analyzed in the Court of Accounts, which will issue directives (and 
timelines) for municipalities to solve the issues identified in the auditors’ reports. One of the 
items analyzed is the debt ratio, which is analyzed by the central government. In fact, the 
local finance law, applicable to municipalities (until 2013), introduced a surveillance method 
based upon debt ratios, calculated using both accrual and budget accounting data. 
  
 
3. Hypotheses development 
 3.1 Need for external auditing in municipalities 
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 As mentioned, several central government functions have been delegated to 
municipalities. Nevertheless, it is the central government that responds to the EU. According 
to agency theory, because it is difficult for the principal to accompany the agent’s behavior 
(information asymmetry), he/she has two options: (i) invest in financial information systems, 
or (ii) establish a contract with the expected outcomes of the agent’s behavior (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Both options are implemented in Portugal. First, there is a major platform run by the 
Local Government Directorate with data retrieved from municipalities on a monthly basis, 
including budgets, financial issues, personnel, debt ratios, and others. Second, there is a 
monitoring Council (since 2014) and there are legally binding performance indicators 
(changed dramatically in 2014). The existence of an external audit is essential to assure the 
accuracy and relevance of the financial information provided by municipalities, and is the 
focus of this study. 
3.2. Public procurement  
Well-developed procurement provides relevant information to managers, identifies 
qualified providers, and aligns organizational needs with the goods or services being 
purchased (Gansler, 2002). Jensen and Payne (2005) find evidence that municipal managers 
view audit procurement as a mechanism for regulating audit quality and audit fees, and 
incorporate it as part of their overall control systems. We refer to a careful and organized 
process of procurement as sophisticated procurement, and expect such mechanisms to help 
identify and hire preferred quality auditors, when appropriate selection criteria are chosen by 
the municipality.   
There are several factors that can be used to ascertain the sophistication of the 
procurement process. The first is the selection criterion that is chosen by the municipality and 
disclosed at the time the audit procurement is announced. As mentioned before, in Portugal, 
municipalities may decide to have a competitive bidding (open procedure) or direct selection 
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(restricted procedure). We are not aware of any prior literature on the choice of direct 
selection (versus competitive bidding). Moreover, the fact that the selection criteria is 
published with the request for proposals also makes this setting different from the selection 
process of auditors for public companies. We believe the use of direct selection may be an 
indicator of a more sophisticated process, as the municipalities directly contact a restricted 
number of providers. The choice of these providers should consider the auditors’ experience, 
reputation, and previous services rendered, so that the most adequate auditors are contacted.5 
However, it is also possible that managers of municipalities have relationships already 
established with some auditing firms, which just makes direct selection more convenient, but 
may bring no advantages for the procurement process. 
 The second factor that can be used to measure the sophistication of the procurement 
process is the duration of the mandate, which is disclosed as the number of years covered by 
the tendering process. A longer mandate reflects a bigger commitment to the auditor chosen 
and allows the auditor to know the municipality in depth. Thus, a long-term commitment to 
an auditor should be associated with a more careful choice of an auditor, i.e., one that is not 
solely based on the lowest price. However, it is also possible that a longer mandate can signal 
an auditor’s entrenchment and complacency, which, especially in cases of high concentration 
of auditors (i.e., an audit market dominated by the Big 4 firms), can contribute to a more 
lenient and less skeptical audit for clients, as discussed by Boone et al. (2012).  
The third factor that can signal sophistication is the number of tenders received. The 
number of tenders in the bidding process is considered a common factor to increase 
competition and leads to a higher administrative burden, especially if the selection criterion is 
not the lowest price. If the most economically advantageous proposal is selected, in order to 
identify which auditor must be chosen, all the variables (such as expertise of the team and the 
detailed working program) must be considered and evaluated. In fact, Tagesson et al. (2015) 
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find that Swedish municipalities select from the Big 4 auditors, mostly based on the lowest 
price. The authors suggest this is simply because other criteria can be subjective and hard to 
evaluate, while price is simple and objective. Moreover, although litigation risk is generally 
low in Portugal, as the number of proposals increases, more tenders are involved, so the 
litigation risk inherent to the legal procedure increases. To avoid or reduce the litigation risk, 
contractors are compelled to implement additional internal controls. These controls increase 
the sophistication of the procurement process. 
Given that there is tension about the direction of the impact of the first two factors 
discussed, we state our first hypothesis on the selection criteria in the null form, as follows: 
H1a: There is no association between the lowest price selection criterion and public 
procurement sophistication. 
 
Tagesson et al. (2015) study the impact of competition on the procurement of audit 
services in the municipal sector of Sweden, and hypothesize that the likelihood that 
municipalities choose professional auditors based on criteria other than price increases when 
political competition is strong. The authors’ argument is that when political competition 
increases, the party in power needs to show voters it is acting responsibly and so chooses an 
audit firm with a good reputation.6 However, their results indicate that “competition between 
political parties did not influence the probability that price would determine the choice of 
professional auditors”. Thus, it is possible that municipalities see political competition as a 
pressure to have lower costs. This pressure for lower costs, as countries face unrelenting 
budget constraints, government downsizing, and public demand for increased transparency 
(Thai, 2017), can lead to a higher importance of price in the selection process. Given these 
opposing arguments, we do not make a prediction on the direction of the association of these 
two variables, and state our second hypothesis on the selection criteria as follows: 
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H1b: There is an association between the lowest price selection criterion and political 
competition. 
 
Jensen and Payne (2005) extend the previous literature by introducing the notion that 
agency costs may serve as a motivating force for organizations to improve their audit-
procurement practices. The authors indicate that agency costs are considered via citizen’s 
interests in municipal decisions, which can be measured by their level of economic input (i.e., 
taxes). They expect a higher level of citizen’s interest to be positively associated with a 
demand for “higher levels of external monitoring, which can be more readily assessed with 
adequate procurement processes.”7 Although Jensen and Payne (2005) proxy for the taxes 
paid via the median family income of the municipalities, their results indicate this variable is 
positively associated with procurement sophistication. Thus, agency costs are relevant for the 
procurement process used by municipalities. Applying this to our context, we expect citizen’s 
interest to be associated with a higher probability of municipalities selecting the most 
economically advantageous proposal for their auditing services. This way, criteria such as a 
detailed auditing report which may include recommendation (for example) will be taken into 
consideration in the selection of the auditor. 
Also following an agency theory perspective, Blank et al. (2009) consider citizens as 
the principal. This rationale makes sense in a country where the municipalities do not receive 
most of their funds via government transfers – Blank et al. (2009) study Sweden, where 
government grants are only 13% of total revenues. However, in Portugal, government grants 
represent more than 66% of total revenues. Thus, in Portugal, the central government is an 
important player in municipalities’ finances. This importance is reinforced by the fact that the 
annual financial directory of Portuguese municipalities develops the concept of 
municipality’s effective autonomy based upon independence from central government 
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transfers. Therefore, we must consider citizens’ interest in two ways: the taxes paid by 
individuals and the grants received from the government. We state our third hypothesis on the 
selection criteria as follows: 
H1c: There is a negative association between the lowest price selection criterion and 
citizens’ interest. 
3.3. Audit fees 
 Several studies have examined audit fees and identified variables which are associated 
with them. Simunic (1980) was the first to address the association between audit quality and 
audit fees in a public company context, whereas Rubin (1988) was the first to address audit 
fees in a municipal environment. Although there is an extensive literature on audit fees, very 
few studies focus on the fees paid by municipalities. In fact, Hay et al. (2006) evaluate and 
summarize a large body of research on audit fees and find only nine studies involving 
municipalities in New Zealand and the United States, in a total of 147 studies. These authors 
stress that audit fees are essential to appraise the competitiveness of the audit market, 
procurement, and independence.  
  From an agency theory perspective, both the external auditors and the auditors which 
work in an internal audit office can monitor the municipality, improving the efficiency of 
public spending. Pilcher et al. (2013) is a case study on Australian police that examines the 
extent to which the external auditor relies on the work performed by the internal auditing 
office, considering that the extent of such reliance depends on the two parties being able to 
communicate efficiently and coordinate their efforts. Their findings show a lack of reliance 
on the work of the internal auditors, due to: resource issues, lack of communication, and a 
perceived lack of competence of the internal auditors. Abbott et al. (2012) also assess 
whether there is an audit fee reduction due to internal audit provided assistance. Their study 
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is based on 134 survey responses from Fortune 1,000 firms, and their results indicate that 
“the amount of internal audit assistance provided (whether by in-house or outsourced internal 
auditors) is negatively and significantly associated with audit fees”.  
Although our setting is different from the one of Abbott et al. (2012), as we analyze 
municipalities’ auditing and the requirements for public accounting in Portugal are different 
from GAAP, we expecting that there is no lack of reliance on the work of the internal 
auditors of municipalities. Thus, we state our first hypothesis on audit fees as follows: 
H2a: Internal auditing is associated with lower audit fees. 
 
Once the auditing service is rendered, the auditing firm issues its report. In case of 
concerns, the report will include a qualified opinion. The higher the risk of the municipality, 
the higher is the probability that a qualified opinion is given. Moreover, there may be indirect 
consequences of auditing risk. One of those consequences is the fact that when the auditor 
perceives higher risk he/she will want to accumulate a greater amount of evidence, increasing 
sample size, before providing an opinion (Arens and Loebbecke, 1984). Consistent with this 
association, Cho et al. (2017) find a negative association between the quality of accruals and 
both audit hours and audit fees in Korea. Moreover, as mentioned by Palmrose (1986), the 
circumstances that lead to the qualified opinion may signal an increased risk of adverse 
actions against the auditor, which also leads to an increase in the desire for assurance. Thus, 
we expect that when the auditing firm perceives a municipality to be riskier, the amount of 
evidence collected increases, leading to a higher audit fee.  
As mentioned before, Portuguese municipalities started applying accrual accounting 
in 2001. However, given the lack of auditing, a priori all municipalities would have been seen 
as risky when auditors first engaged them. Moreover, mistakes in the application of accrual 
accounting were still prevalent in many municipalities in 2007. This increases the potential 
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risk of the audit, and the probability of qualified opinions. We state our second hypothesis on 
audit fees as follows: 
H2b: A qualified opinion in the auditors’ report is associated with higher audit fees. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Sample and Data Collection 
 The data analyzed in this study start in 2007, as that is the year when external auditing 
became compulsory for some municipalities, and end in 2011, the last complete fiscal year at 
the time we administered our survey. The general directorate of local administration 
publishes (in a web platform) municipality consolidated financial information. The data 
missing from the dgal.pt website are partially recovered using the financial statements 
published on-line by each municipality.8,9 Although our population consists of 308 
municipalities, some observations are lost due to missing data on some of the financial 
variables required for our initial analysis. Thus, data on 303 municipalities (1,515 
observations, given we cover five years) is used in our initial descriptive analysis.  
Our main source of data is a survey, created by the authors and sent to the financial 
managers of all Portuguese municipalities. There are 64 respondents. However, only 57 of 
them sent all the information required. These municipalities represent 285 observations (57*5 
years), which are used in our initial descriptive analysis. However, we lose 115 observations 
as there are municipalities that answered our survey but do not have external auditing (e.g.: 
Albufeira) and municipalities that do not have external auditing during all the years we cover 
(e.g.: Aveiro). This reduces the size of the sample available to test our hypotheses on auditing 
procurement and fees down to 170 observations, which cover 38 municipalities. Table 1 
shows how we reach this final sample. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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We use our survey to collect information on several variables of interest to our study: 
selection criteria, the factors considered when the most economically advantageous tender 
selection criterion is used, the number of tenders, auditor selection process, type of auditor, 
auditing fees, existence of internal auditing, capital participation, etc.10 The initial set of 
questions was based on the studies of Hackenbrack et al. (2000) and Jensen and Payne 
(2005). Next, we pre-tested the survey with field experts and made the adjustments deemed 
necessary. The survey was launched in 2012, and respondents were invited to answer on-line. 
The on-line design of the questionnaire makes it possible to skip questions that are of no 
interest, and facilitates the respondent’s task of presenting information for each of the five 
years covered by the study.11 Whenever possible the responses received double-checked by 
us through different public sources, in order to verify the veracity of the answers.12 Moreover, 
the municipal officials, especially directors and chiefs, abide by an ethics code of conduct of 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Thus, the reliability 
of the data is high. 
The percentage of respondents is 18.8%, considering a population of 303 
municipalities during 2007-2011. The existence of non-respondents may be responsible for 
biased results, if the municipalities which did not respond to the survey have heterogeneous 
or dispersed characteristics (Stede et al., 2005). To access this issue, we perform a two-factor 
analysis based upon geographical territorial coverage (district), and political party. We find 
that the sample is representative along these dimensions.13 Thus, the results of this article 
may be generalizable to the entire population under study, though some care is necessary, due 
to possible size considerations.14 
 Information regarding municipality characteristics, such as area, and political parties’ 
votes, is obtained through PORDATA, a database of contemporary Portugal organized and 
developed by the Francisco Manuel dos Santos Foundation, created in 2009. The reported 
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statistics are derived from official and certified sources.15 As the identification of 
municipalities with or without external auditor is not publicly available, a formal request to 
the Portuguese Institute of Statutory Auditors was made in order to acquire information about 
the municipalities with an external auditor from 2007 to 2011. Information regarding which 
municipalities own shares (capital participation) in local companies is obtained through the 
annual financial directory of Portuguese municipalities.  
4.2 Model specifications and related control variables 
4.2.1 Public procurement determinants model. In order to test the three 
associations stated in our first set of hypotheses, we need to create a measure of the use of the 
lowest price selection criterion. This information is provided as answer to a question in our 
survey. The lowest audit fee offer (Lowest_Fee) is the dependent variable of interest, and is 
created as an indicator variable. This variable is coded as one when the external auditor’s 
selection is based upon the lowest price selection criterion in a public procurement process, 
and zero when the most economically advantageous proposal is chosen. We estimate the 
following logit model: 
Log (p/(1 – p)) = β0 + β1Direct_Sel + β2Mandate  + β3Prop_Rec + β4Political_Compet + 
β5Grants + β6Tax + β7Size + β8Debt + βiDkyear                                  (1) 
 The independent variables, which are the determinants of the use of the lowest price 
selection criterion, can be classified into: (i) public procurement sophistication variables: type 
of procurement process, mandate and number of proposals received; (ii) political 
competition; (iii) citizens’ interest measures; and (iv) controls.  
The public procurement sophistication variables stem from public procurement law. 
The chosen public procurement process is represented by a dummy variable that identifies 
whether public procurement direct selection (Direct_Sel) was used, in which case the variable 
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was coded as one. If a competitive procedure was used, this variable is coded as zero. The 
number of years included in the public procurement process can also affect the selection 
criterion. We measure this with a variable that measures the length of the mandate, which 
implies the auditor’s rotation (Mandate). A higher number of proposals received should be 
positively associated with the level of sophistication of the procurement process. As the 
number of proposals increases,  contractors are compelled to implement additional internal 
controls to reduce litigation risk, which increase the sophistication of the procurement 
process. Thus, we expect to estimate a negative coefficient for the variable Prop_Rec. 
 Political competition is measured by a Herfindhal index, calculated as the sum of the 
squared weights of all political parties. The weight of each party is calculated as the number 
of seats the party has on the town council, divided by the total number of seats. This is a 
direct result of elections.16 We do not make a directional prediction on H1b, so we have no 
expectations for the sign of the coefficients estimated for this variable. 
 To measure citizens’ interest, we use two variables: Grants and Tax. Grants is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of central government transfers. Tax is measured as tax 
per capita. Thus, Tax measures the economic input given directly by citizens, while Grants 
measures the overall economic input, given by government. As we predict a negative 
association between the lowest price selection criterion and citizens’ interest, we expect the 
estimated coefficients of both Grants and Tax to be negative.  
 The control variables cover two auditee features: size, and risk.17 We expect Size to be 
negatively associated with selection based upon lowest price, larger municipalities should 
have more sophisticated procedures in place and be more complex to audit. Size is measured 
by the area of the municipality, in square kilometers. In Portugal, the debt ratio (debt over 
average revenues) is the municipalities’ legal measure of risk, as stated in the local finance 
laws. Thus, we use it as a proxy for audit risk. Though municipalities with higher levels of 
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debt should procure with better care, it is also possible that the lowest price selection criterion 
may be used to hide the municipalities’ financial situation. Therefore, we make no directional 
prediction for this variable. Finally, to control for possible time effects, a set of dummy 
variables Dkyear is included in our model (excluding the year 2011). The description of all 
variables is in Appendix A. 
4.2.2 Audit fees model. In order to test the three associations stated in our second set 
of hypotheses, we create a new model, where the value of audit fees is the dependent 
variable. This is represented by Aud_Fee, the natural logarithm of the value of audit fees. We 
estimate the following model: 
Aud_Fee = β0 + β1Internal_Aud + β2Qual_Opinion + β3Grants + β4Tax + β5Size + 
β6Debt + Β7Auditor_Firm + βiDkyear + ε                                                  (2) 
 The existence of an internal audit office should be negatively associated with audit 
fees. To measure the impact of this association on audit fees, we use an indicator variable 
(Internal_Aud), which is coded as one for municipalities with an internal audit office, and 0 
otherwise. Qual_Opinion is also an indicator variable, which is coded as one when the 
auditor issued a report with a qualified opinion (with or without emphasis), and zero 
otherwise. The existence of a qualified opinion should be associated with the payment of 
higher fees. 
 As control variables, we use five variables, four of which were also included in 
equation 1. As before, we use two variables to measure citizens’ interest: Grants and Tax. We 
expect them to be positively associated with the fees paid by municipalities, as citizens’ 
interest can lead to higher scrutiny, and as a consequence, higher work load for the auditors. 
We also expect to find a positive association between Size and Debt, and audit fees. This is 
because auditing a larger or more risky municipality should involve more work hours, leading 
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to higher fees. The last control variable is Auditor_Firm, which aims at controlling for the 
possibility of firms charging higher fees than individuals. Auditor is an indicator variable, 
coded as one when the auditing services are performed by a company, and zero otherwise. 
We expect it to have a positive association with audit fees, as there is earlier evidence of 
firms trying to charge a premium for their auditing services, especially when these are Big 4 
firms (e.g.: Deis and Giroux, 1992). Finally, and as in model 1, we include a set of dummy 
variables to control for time effects.  
 
5. Findings and discussion 
5.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate tests 
5.1.1 External Auditing. Compulsory external auditing, for some municipalities, was 
introduced by law in 2007. External auditing is compulsory when a municipality participates 
in local municipal, local intermunicipal and commercial companies, and foundations. Data 
from the Portuguese Institute of Statutory Auditors indicates that in 2007 almost a third of 
Portuguese municipalities have external auditing (76 out of 227) and in 2008 the number 
more than doubles (becoming 161), stabilizing in 2010 (when it is 181). We next cross-check 
this information with municipalities’ participation in foundations, local municipal companies, 
local intermunicipal companies, and commercial companies, which we obtain through our 
survey. We surveyed several cases in which there is participation in foundations (1 case), 
local municipal companies (28 cases), local intermunicipal companies (31 cases), and 
commercial companies (15 cases), without external auditing. So, the results suggest that there 
are municipalities that do not comply with the law.  
 In the whole sample, 51% of the observations are from municipalities that have 
external auditors, while this percentage is 65% when it comes to the observations we collect 
from the survey. To analyze whether participation in companies or foundations is the only 
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substantial difference between municipalities with external auditing and municipalities 
without external auditing, or if there are other statistically significant differences based upon 
other municipality characteristics, we perform a two-sample t-test for the equality of means 
for several variables. We analyze Political_Compt, Grants, Tax, Debt, and Size. We apply the 
test to both the respondents of the survey and population, with or without external auditing. 
Table 2 indicates there are significant differences between the group with external auditing 
and the group without external auditing, both in the population, and in the respondents of the 
survey (suggesting consistency in the population and survey results). In fact, political 
competition is the only variable where we do not find a significant difference between groups 
for both the respondents and the population. Given that municipalities with external auditing 
statistically differ from those which have no external auditing across several dimensions, we 
conclude it is not only participation in companies or foundations that differentiates these 
municipalities. This reinforces the need to control for these variables in our multivariate 
analyses. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
5.1.2 Procurement and selection process. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for 
procurement and selection process variables. As shown in Panel A, we find that direct 
selection in a restricted procedure is the municipalities’ choice for the procurement process, 
with minor exceptions. In fact, there are only four observations in our sample which do not 
use direct selection.18 Next, we document that the selection criterion of choice is the lowest 
price, as over 71% of observations answer they use this and not the most economically 
advantageous proposal. This figure is very close to the 72% of Swedish municipalities that 
choose audit firms with the lowest bid (Tagesson et al., 2015).  
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 The number of years covered by the public procurement process ranges from 1 to 4 
years (variable Mandate) but, on average, the auditor stays around two years (mean is 2.4) 
and the procurement process tends to last for the maximum number of years permitted by the 
procurement process law (median is 3).19 The number of proposals received in a tendering 
process (variable Prop_Rec) has a mean and median of 3, although the proposals have from 1 
to 12 tenders in a procurement process. The value of 12 tenders is found in observations 
where direct selection is not the procurement process. In the subsample where direct selection 
is used, the maximum number of tenders is seven. Seven is also the maximum number of 
proposals requested by municipalities (when using direct selection), although the mean value 
of proposals requested is 3.26. Finally, we find that more than 75% of those municipalities 
get tenders from all the firms contacted. 
 Municipalities mostly chose an auditor firm, and not an individual auditor – the mean 
of indicator variable Auditor_Firm is 0.88. However, while Tagesson et al. (2015) find that in 
Sweden, the Big 4 auditing firms dominate the auditing of municipalities, we do not find a 
single Portuguese municipality which is audited by any of the Big 4.20 In the survey we also 
ask municipalities to identify their auditors. Out of the 25 municipalities which disclosed 
their auditors’ names, 10 changed auditors. If we consider that several municipalities do not 
need an external auditor for all of the five years analyzed and that the duration of the contract 
could be up to four years in the period covered, this indicates that there is in fact a significant 
rotation of auditors. The annual audit fees in municipalities range from 2,000€ to 36,000€. 
Their median is 12,000€, which is very close to the mean.21 
 Finally, we find that most of the opinions issued by auditors are qualified opinions, 
indicating that the overall quality of municipalities’ financial statements is not good. This 
may be due to the fact that from 2001 (when accrual accounting was introduced) to 2007, 
municipalities were not audited. Moreover, of the 127 qualified opinions in our sample, 93 
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also included an emphasis on some issue. In fact, only 10 observations have a “clean bill of 
health” for their financial statements, as they received an unqualified opinion, with no 
emphasis. The remaining observations have a report which is mostly clean, but has at least an 
emphasis. 
 Next, we try to better understand what kind of factors influence public procurement 
selection of external auditing when the most economically advantageous selection criterion is 
used. Panel B of Table 3 shows that respondents care about the specialization of the auditor 
(39.1%), a detailed work plan (23.9%), and a detailed work report, which also includes 
suggestions (21.7%). We also analyze the number of factors used in each public procurement 
process: in 19 cases, only one factor for the selection criterion is considered, besides price 
(41.3%), and two and four factors as selection criteria have the same weight (23.9%), with 11 
cases each.22,23 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
5.2 Correlation matrix 
 Table 4 shows the Pearson correlations between the variables used in our study, where 
the figures in bold are correlations that are statistically significant (at a five percent 
significance level). Results show that Lowest_Fee is negatively correlated with Mandate, 
Prop_Rec, Political_Compet, and Grants, providing some information about hypotheses H1a, 
H1b, and H1c. Moreover, we find a positive correlation between Qual_opinion and Aud_Fee. 
This correlation is consistent with the prediction we make in hypothesis H2b. Finally, the 
negative correlation between the lowest price selection criterion (Lowest_Fee) and audit fees 
(Aud_Fee) reinforces Beattie and Fearnley’s (1998) opinion that competition over price may 
lead to low-balling. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
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5.3 Multivariate regression 
5.3.1 Public procurement multivariate regression. Table 5 presents the results of 
estimating four alternative specifications of equation (1), in order to study the determinants of 
the use of the lowest price selection criterion by municipalities. In model 1.1, all the 
independent variables are included, as in equation (1). In model 1.2, the variable Direct_Sel is 
removed, because our descriptive statistics reveal that only four observations use an open 
bidding, i.e., this variable has low variation. In model 1.3, we include variables that are the 
result of principal component analysis, considering the three variables that proxy for 
sophistication and the two that proxy for citizens’ interests. Model 1.4 is similar to the 
previous one, and the only difference is that when running the principal component analysis 
for sophistication, we do not consider Direct_Sel.24 All four specifications have a high 
percentage of correct predictions, which indicates a good fit to the data. 
 Hypothesis 1a is stated in the null and regards the association between the lowest 
price selection criterion and public procurement sophistication (which is measured via three 
variables: Direct_Sel, Mandate, and Prop_Rec). Results show the estimated coefficients for 
these variables as well as the coefficients of the two factors created to reflect sophistication 
(Sophistication_3 and Sophistication_2), are negative and statistically significant. This 
indicates that (i) a longer mandate leads to a more careful choice of auditor, where factors 
other than price are considered, (ii) a higher number of proposals received is associated with 
a more sophisticated selection, possibly due to an increased litigation risk, and (iii) direct 
selection can be a mechanism to ask auditors with desirable characteristics to make a 
proposal. Moreover, the fact that Mandate is negatively associated with the lowest price 
selection suggests that there is no entrenchment or complacency in these auditors, as 
discussed above and mentioned by Boone et al. (2012).  
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 Hypothesis 1b states there is an association between the lowest price selection 
criterion and political competition. Our results show that the coefficient estimated for 
Political_Compt is negative and statistically significant, indicating that higher concentration 
of the votes is associated with a lower probability of using the lowest price selection criterion. 
Thus, a lower level of political competition is associated with a selection process which does 
not rely solely on price.  
 Hypothesis 1c states there is a negative association between the lowest price selection 
criterion and citizens’ interest (measured by the variables Grants and Tax). Results show that 
the estimated coefficient for Grants is negative and significant, as expected, indicating that 
the more the municipalities rely on government transfers, the highest is the probability that 
they will consider factors other than price in their auditors’ selection. However, the 
coefficient of Tax is not statistically significant. The coefficients of the factor Citizens (result 
of principal components analysis) are negative and statistically significant, both in model 1.3 
and 1.4. However, these coefficients may be driven solely by Grants. Thus, hypothesis H1c is 
only partially supported.  
 Results also indicate that there is a size effect, as larger municipalities have a higher 
probability of using the lowest price selection criterion. As an additional analysis, and to 
access the existence of multicollinearity in our models, we have run OLS models similar to 
the other model in Table 5 and estimated the variance inflation factors (VIFs). Results 
indicate that there are no multicollinearity concerns, as the mean VIF values are 1.49, 1.43, 
1.44, and 1.43, respectively. The maximum VIF values for the individual variables are also 
low: 2.05, 1.92, 1.90, and 1.90, respectively.  
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
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5.3.2 Audit fees multivariate regression. Table 6 presents the results of two 
alternative specifications of equation (2), which analyzes audit fees. The first specification 
includes all the variables of equation (2), while the second uses Citizens, a factor that results 
from the principal component analysis of Grants and Tax (as included in Table 5).  
 Hypothesis 2a states that the existence of an internal auditing office is associated with 
lower audit fees. Consistent with this expectation, the coefficient estimated for the variable 
Internal_Aud is negative and statistically significant. This suggests that the internal auditors 
provide assistance to the external auditors, alleviating their work load, and leading to lower 
fees. It also indicates the external auditors trust the work performed by the internal auditors. 
Hypothesis 2b states that municipalities with a qualified opinion pay more for their audit 
services. The positive and significant estimated coefficients of Qual_Opinion confirm this 
relation. This suggests that the auditors accumulate a greater amount of evidence, which leads 
to more billable hours and a higher audit fee.25  
The estimated coefficients of Grants and Tax are positive and statistically significant 
as well as the coefficient for Citizens. Thus, higher interest from citizens is associated with 
higher fees. Results also show the existence of a size effect. An analysis of the geographical 
location of the larger municipalities reveals these are mostly rural. Thus, the lower fee may 
be associated with a less complex auditing. Moreover, we find that auditing firms do not 
receive higher fees than individual auditors. Thus, they do not extract any kind of premium. 
This is consistent with our finding that there are no Big 4 firms auditing municipalities. 
Finally, the estimated coefficients of the indicator variables for the years analyzed are never 
statistically significant. Thus, we conclude that although Portugal was severely hit by the 
2008 financial crisis, this did not have a direct impact on the audit fees paid by 
municipalities. As an additional analysis, in order to access the existence of multicollinearity 
in our models, we estimate the variance inflation factors (VIFs). Results indicate that there 
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are no multicollinearity concerns, as the mean VIF values are either 1.38 or 1.39, and the VIF 
values for the individual variables are also low (maximums of 1.97 and 1.90). 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
5.3.3 Additional analysis. Given that we find, when testing our first hypothesis, that 
both sophistication and political competition are negatively associated with the use of the 
lowest price selection criterion, it would be redundant to test if these two variables were 
associated with price, as a mechanical effect would exist.26 However, the relation between 
sophistication, political competition and audit fees is not clear for the municipalities that do 
not use the lowest price as their selection criterion. Thus, we next assess these relations. 
Given the very small size of the sample (just 49 observations), we test the two associations 
separately, while still considering the control variables included in equation (2). Table 7 
presents the results. The first model tests sophistication, using Sophistication_3 (as included 
in Table 5). The second model includes Political_Compet. Results show that the coefficient 
for Sophistication_3 is positive and statistically significant. Thus, even when the lowest price 
is not the selection criterion, sophistication is still associated with a higher audit fee. This 
indicates some municipalities are willing to bear a cost in order to have a more sophisticated 
procedure for the selection of their auditor. The coefficient for Political_Compet is negative 
and statistically significant, indicating that in municipalities with a higher concentration of 
votes, the price paid for auditing is lower.   
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
In an untabulated analysis we also use the 170 observations considered in Table 6, 
considering an indicator variable coded as one when the municipality does not use the lowest 
price and zero otherwise. Results of such an analysis reveal that the estimated coefficient is 
positive (0.32) and statistically significant. Thus, although the use of the most economically 
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advantageous criterion does not automatically lead to a higher fee, there is an association 
between the two things. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 In this study, we perform a comprehensive analysis of municipal auditing, exploring 
its several steps: procurement, decision on selection criteria, selection, render and payment of 
services, and opinion provided. Our setting is Portugal, where external auditing of 
municipalities’ accounts has recently been introduced. Our dataset is unique, resulting from 
merging new survey data with data that is not publicly available. The period considered for 
analysis of data is 2007 to 2011. 
 We find that the majority of municipalities acquire auditing services through direct 
selection and choose their auditors based upon the lowest price selection criterion. However, 
municipalities where the procurement process is more sophisticated employ the lowest price 
selection criterion less frequently. The auditor selected is usually a firm (instead of an 
individual CPA), but never one of the Big 4 companies. The audit fee paid for the auditing 
services is higher when the level of citizens’ interest increases and when the auditors’ opinion 
is qualified, and lower when the municipality has an internal auditing office. Our findings 
should be of interest to governments and regulators, given the focus on municipalities and the 
fact that external auditing comes as a consequence of EU regulations. They should also be of 
interest to professionals working in auditing, and especially those interested in municipalities, 
as our findings may direct them in a public procurement process. 
 This article is subject to one limitation that may affect our findings: the number of 
respondents for this investigation. It is not possible to exclude the possibility of bias resulting 
from the number of respondents of the survey. The respondents are municipalities with a 
higher population, and with more revenue related to taxation (and revenues as a whole) than 
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the global average. Finally, we must recognize that due to our sample size we are not able to 
add municipal fixed effects to our models. 
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Footnotes 
1. The total amount of revenues deducted from transfers and financial liabilities against 
the total amount of revenues ratio is compared to the indicator of financial 
independence, considered as 50%. 
2. During the period covered in this study, two different public procurement laws for 
audit services are applied. Until 2008, the decree-law 197/99 was applicable; while 
from 2008 onwards, the applicable regulation was decree-law 18/2008 (adapted to EU 
Regulation). As a municipality can contract for one, two, or three-year periods of 
auditing, through 2007 and 2008, the decree-law 197/99 was the only one applicable. 
In 2009, either of the two laws could be applied depending on the year (or month) the 
procurement process started; and in 2010, decree-law 18/2008 was compulsory for all 
acquisitions. 
3. In general, according to Nielsen and Hansen (2001), the European Union can use five 
different kinds of procurement procedures: (i) Open procedure, in which all interested 
suppliers may submit tenders; (ii) Restricted procedure: only invited suppliers may 
present tenders; (iii) Accelerated procedures: restricted to special cases; (iv) 
Negotiated procedures; (v) Qualification procedure. The negotiated and accelerated 
procedures in the Portuguese legislation can occur only under very special 
circumstances, and are not applied to services such as auditing. When the 
qualification procedure is used, the municipality must, in a second stage, use either a 
bidding or direct selection, only for a restricted group of qualified tenders. Thus, 
overall we can either have a case of competitive bidding (open procedure) or direct 
selection (restricted procedure). 
4. The new local finance law (Law 73/2013) enhanced the procedure. Moreover, from 
2013 onwards, municipalities are obliged to have an external auditor if their expense 
budget reaches one million euros. 
5. Consistent with this view that experience is relevant in the selection of auditors, 
Cahan and Sun (2015) find that the experience of auditors in China is negatively 
associated with earnings management.  
6. Blank et al. (2009) do not study procurement (they analyze audit fees), but use an 
argument similar to Tagesson et al. (2015) when it comes to the importance of 
competition. The authors mention that when political competition is present, the 
opposing parties continuously create conflicts and distrust, and systematically raise 
questions and doubts about the actions of the party in power, and that this 
environment leads to an increase in the monitoring efforts in auditing and results in 
extra work for the auditor. Other authors, such as Baber et al. (1987), Deis and Giroux 
(1992), and Ward et al. (1994), confirm that political competition may influence the 
external auditing process. 
7. Ward et al. (1994) and Baber et al. (1987) also consider the impact of citizens’ 
interest, when analyzing audit fees.  
8. Municipalities Amadora (2007 to 2009), Amarante (2007), Bragança (2008), Celorico 
da Beira (2008), Mesão Frio (2008), Pedrógão Grande (2007), Santa Cruz (2007), and 
Vila Nova de Cerveira (2007). 
9. Municipalities are compelled by the local finance law to publish on-line the last two 
years of financial statements. It was possible to download data concerning three of the 
eight municipalities missing, Amarante, Bragança, and Celorico da Beira. 
10. The survey is available from the authors, upon request. 
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11. Some examples, (i) if asked if there is an internal audit office, a “no” answer skips the 
question about its hierarchy; (ii) after answering about local companies’ participation, 
the respondent is asked if external auditing services are contracted within the 2007 to 
2011 period. If not, the questionnaire ends for this respondent. 
12. The procurement process and the mandate of the auditor are examples of information 
that was double-checked.  
13. In terms of geographical representation, we find that only three out of 20 districts are 
not represented in the survey. Concerning political party representation: only one out 
of seven political parties (CDS-PP, which is not one of the main parties) is not 
represented in the responses to the survey. 
14. Jensen and Payne (2005) face the same dilemma, so they restrict the population to 
include only municipalities above 5,000 inhabitants. This is not an option in our case 
as we also study law compliance with external auditing obligations, which is not 
dependent upon size. 
15. Information retrieved from http://www.pordata.pt/. 
16. There were local administration elections in 2005 and 2009. Thus, the values of 
political competition are stable in 2007, 2008 and 2009, and change for 2010 and 
2011 (as a result of the elections). 
17. Given that the municipalities which are required to have an external auditor are the 
most complex ones (due to their participation in companies or foundations), all our 
municipalities could be classified as complex. Thus, we do need to include an 
indicator variable to control for the additional fees complex municipalities pay (when 
compared to the rest). 
18. These four observations which use competitive bidding are split evenly when it comes 
to the selection criteria: two use the lowest price criterion, while the other two select 
the most economically advantageous proposal. 
19. The maximum is four years, as the old law allowed for contracts of four years. One 
year is the minimum time allowed per law.  
20. There are only two cases of second tier multinational firms being explicitly identified. 
Note that Portuguese auditor’s law forbids local companies to adopt international 
brand names unless the latter participates in the local companies’ capital. 
21. This value is much lower than the mean value of auditing a public firm. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the low value of the fee is associated with the fact that most 
auditors are locals (i.e., they are headquartered in the municipality they audit). 
22. To identify the factors in the survey, we use factors from the literature review, bids 
published in journals, and ask professionals in the field to identify the most common 
factors.  
23. Though earlier studies (GAO, 1987; AICPA, 2014) indicate that compliance with 
standards or seniority of the team are important factors, the respondents do not 
identify them in their public procurement process. 
24. The principal component analysis is performed creating factors with an eigenvalue 
higher than 1. The Sophistication_3 factor explains 54% of the variation of the three 
variables included, while the Sophistication_2 factor explains 65% of the variation of 
the two variables included (Mandate and Proposals_Rec). The Citizens factor 
explains 65% of the variation of the two variables included (Grants and Tax). 
25. It is also possible that there is a risk component to the additional fees. 
26. The results of such a model indicate that our coefficients of interest for the fees’ 
model (Grants, Tax, Internal_Aud and Qual_opinion) have the predicted signs and are 
statistically significant.   
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Appendix A – Variables’ description 
Variable Description Source 
Lowest_Fee  Criteria for choosing candidates. Indicator 
variable coded 1 when municipality chooses the 
audit service provider with the lowest fee, and 0 
otherwise. 
Survey 
Direct_Sel  Procurement method. Indicator variable coded 1 
when municipality uses a restricted procurement 
process (direct selection), and 0 otherwise 
(bidding process). 
Survey 
Mandate  Number of years of the mandate of the 
procurement process. Range is from 1 to 4. 
Survey 
Prop_Rec  Number of proposals received for external 
auditing. 
Survey 
Political_Compet  Herfindhal Index, calculated using the weights of 
the several political parties. 
PORDATA 
Grants  Natural logarithm of total amount of transfers 
originated at Central Government level. 
DGAL and 
Municipalities 
website 
Tax  Tax, per capita. DGAL and 
Municipalities 
website 
Size  Land covered by the municipality. PORDATA 
Debt  Ratio of total debt over revenues.  DGAL and 
Municipalities 
website 
Aud_Fee  Audit Fee. Logarithm of price, per year, of the 
external auditing services. 
Survey 
Internal_Aud  Indicator variable, coded 1 when municipality 
has an internal auditing office, and 0 otherwise.  
Survey 
Qual_Opinion  Indicator variable, coded 1 when municipality 
receives a qualified opinion, and 0 otherwise. 
Survey 
Auditor_Firm Indicator variable, coded 1 when auditing is 
performed by a company of auditors, and 0 
otherwise (individual auditor). 
Survey 
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Table 1 – Sample 
Population (308 municipalities, 5 years) 1,540 
Missing data (5 municipalities, 5 years) (25) 
Population sample for initial tests 1,515 
Survey not answered (239 municipalities, 5 years) (1,195) 
Incomplete surveys (7 municipalities, 5 years) (35) 
Survey sample for initial tests 285 
Observations without external auditing  (115) 
Sample for test of hypotheses 170 
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Table 2, Panel A – Comparison of observations from survey, considering the need for an 
external auditor (N=285) 
 
With External 
Auditor 
(N=170) 
Without External 
Auditor 
(N=115) 
Survey  
T-stat  
 
Political_Compet 0.50 0.51 -0.98  
Grants 16.17 15.89 3.22 *** 
Tax 230.23 213.82 0.64   
Debt  0.89 0.67 2.76 *** 
Size 247.72 205.34 1.73 * 
 
Table 2, Panel B – Comparison of observations from population, considering the need for an 
external auditor (N=1,515) 
 
With External 
Auditor 
(N=772) 
Without External 
Auditor  
(N=743) 
Population  
T-stat 
 
Political_Compet 0.52 0.51  0.21  
Grants 16.04 15.72  5.73 *** 
Tax 188.55 156.00  2.30 **  
Debt 0.89 0.60  4.50 *** 
Size 327.73 277.59  2.02 ** 
Notes:  
*** p-value lower than 0.01; ** p-value lower than 0.05; * p-value lower than 0.10; 
Political_Compet: Herfindhal Index, calculated using the weights of the several political parties; 
Grants: Natural logarithm of total amount of transfers originated at Central Government level; 
Tax: Tax, per capita; 
Debt: Ratio of total debt over revenues; 
Size: Land covered by the municipality. 
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Table 3, Panel A – Auditing steps: procurement, selection and opinion (N= 170) 
Variables Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Direct selection  0.9765 1 0.1520 
Lowest fee 0.7118 1 0.4543 
Mandate  2.3765 3 1.0712 
Proposals received  3.0471 3 2.2684 
Auditor firm 0.8824 1 0.3231 
Qual_Opinion 0.7471 1 0.4360 
Notes:  
The maximum value for Mandate is 4 years and the maximum value for Proposals received is 12; 
Direct selection: Procurement method. Indicator variable coded 1 when municipality uses a restricted 
procurement process (direct selection), and 0 otherwise (bidding process); 
Lowest fee: Criteria for choosing candidates. Indicator variable coded 1 when municipality chooses the audit 
service provider with the lowest fee, and 0 otherwise; 
Mandate: Number of years of the mandate of the procurement process. Range is from 1 to 4; 
Proposals received: Number of proposals received for external auditing; 
Auditor firm: Indicator variable, coded 1 when auditing is performed by a company of auditors, and 0 otherwise 
(individual auditor); 
Qual_Opinion: Indicator variable, coded 1 when municipality receives a qualified opinion, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Table 3, Panel B – Factors considered in procurement, besides price (N=49) 
Factors N %  
Specialization in field 20 40.8%  
Standards’ compliance 0 0.0%  
Team competence 0 0.0%  
Detailed work plan 11 22.4%  
Detailed report 10 20.4%  
Other – not explained 8 16.3%  
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Table 4 – Correlation matrix (N=170) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Lowest_Fee (1) 1             
Direct_Sel (2) 0.073 1            
Mandate (3) -0.238 -0.163 1           
Prop_Rec (4) -0.389 -0.443 0.302 1          
Political_Compet (5) -0.166 0.119 -0.206 -0.238 1         
Grants (6) -0.251 -0.214 0.234 0.346 -0.448 1        
Tax (7) -0.002 -0.139 0.011 0.110 -0.302 0.306 1       
Size (8) 0.177 0.105 -0.048 -0.182 0.024 0.065 -0.036 1      
Debt (9) -0.082 0.020 0.001 -0.145 0.111 -0.036 -0.012 -0.043 1     
Aud_Fee (10) -0.364 -0.158 0.170 0.236 -0.228 0.497 0.331 -0.126 0.019 1    
Internal_Aud (11) -0.085 -0.024 0.177 0.119 -0.324 0.087 0.352 -0.147 0.010 -0.049 1   
Qual_Opinion (12) -0.042 -0.001 0.154 0.048 -0.220 -0.046  0.076 -0.132 0.181 0.201 -0.022 1  
Auditor_Firm (13) -0.031 0.184 0.043 -0.009 0.040 0.215  0.143 0.107 -0.045 0.210 -0.130 0.40 1 
Notes: Correlation in bold are statistically significant, at a 5% confidence level; all variables defined on Appendix A. 
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Table 5 – Equation (1): Logit regression analysis on Lowest_Fee (N = 170) 
 Model 1.1 Model  1.2 Model  1.3 Model 1.4 
 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Direct_Sel -3.425 0.021       
Mandate -0.695 0.005 -0.603 0.010     
Proposals_Rec -0.451 0.000 -0.320 0.001     
Sophistication_3     -0.784 0.001   
Sophistication_2       -1.124 0.000 
Political_Compet -11.597 0.000 -11.091 0.000 -8.352 0.000 -10.119 0.000 
Grants -1.462 0.001 -1.475 0.001     
Tax 0.000 0.930 0.001 0.612     
Citizens     -0.574 0.004 -0.646 0.002 
Size 0.004 0.021 0.004 0.029 0.002 0.049 0.003 0.038 
 38 
 
Debt -0.486 0.169 -0.596 0.083 -0.391 0.214 -0.454 0.169 
Year FE Included  Included  Included  Included  
Constant 36.339 0.000 32.699 0.000 5.012 0.000 5.906 0.000 
LR p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Correct prediction 82%  81%  76%  80%  
Pseudo R2 0.356  0.330  0.219  0.292  
Notes: 
Lowest fee: Criteria for choosing candidates. Indicator variable coded 1 when municipality chooses the audit service provider with the lowest fee, and 0 otherwise; 
Direct selection: Procurement method. Indicator variable coded 1 when municipality uses a restricted procurement process (direct selection), and 0 otherwise; 
Mandate: Number of years of the mandate of the procurement process. Range is from 1 to 4; 
Proposals_Rec: Number of proposals received for external auditing; 
Sophistication_3: factor resulting from principal component analysis of the three sophistication variables; 
Sophistication_2: factor resulting from principal component analysis of two sophistication variables; 
Political_Compet: Herfindhal Index, calculated using the weights of the several political parties; 
Grants: Natural logarithm of total amount of transfers originated at Central Government level; 
Tax: Tax, per capita; 
Citizens: factor resulting from principal component analysis of Grants and Tax; 
Size: Land covered by the municipality; 
Debt: Ratio of total debt over revenues. 
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Table 6 – Equation (2): OLS regression analysis on audit fees (N = 170) 
 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 
 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Internal_Aud -0.199 0.004 -0.233 0.001  
Qual_Opinion 0.238 0.019 0.221 0.027  
Grants 0.328 0.000    
Tax 0.001 0.003    
Citizens   0.267 0.000  
Size -0.000 0.004 -0.000 0.004  
Debt -0.027 0.729 -0.029 0.717  
Auditor_firm 0.111 0.527 0.113 0.515  
Year FE Included  Included   
Constant 3.805 0.000 9.362 0.000  
Adj. R2 33.94% 32.80%   
p-value of F-stat 0.000                       0.000  
Notes: 
Audit Fees: Logarithm of price, per year, of the external auditing services; 
Internal_Aud: Indicator variable, coded 1 when municipality has an internal auditing office, and 0 
otherwise. 
Qual_Opinion: Indicator variable, coded 1 when municipality receives a qualified opinion, and 0 
otherwise; 
Grants: Natural logarithm of total amount of transfers originated at Central Government level; 
Tax: Tax, per capita; 
Citizens: factor resulting from principal component analysis of Grants and Tax; 
Size: Land covered by the municipality; 
Debt: Ratio of total debt over revenues; 
Auditor firm: Indicator variable, coded 1 when auditing is performed by a company of auditors, 
and 0 otherwise (individual auditor). 
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Table 7 – Sub-sample where municipalities choose the most economically 
advantageous proposal (N = 49) 
 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Sophistication_3 0.117 0.012    
Political_Comp   -1.850 0.000  
Size -0.001 0.159 -0.001 0.064  
Debt -0.048 0.670 -0.147 0.123  
Auditor_firm -0.092 0.634 -0.066 0.612  
Year FE Included  Included   
Constant 9.851 0.000 11.029 0.000  
Adj. R2 2.31% 32.07%   
p-value of F-stat 0.000                       0.015  
Notes: 
Sophistication_3: factor resulting from principal component analysis of the three sophistication 
variables; 
Political_Compet: Herfindhal Index, calculated using the weights of the several political parties; 
Size: Land covered by the municipality; 
Debt: Ratio of total debt over revenues; 
Auditor firm: Indicator variable, coded 1 when auditing is performed by a company of auditors, 
and 0 otherwise (individual auditor). 
 
 
 
